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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
INTRODUCTION
The law governing the creation, maintenance, and transfer of
rights in minerals is simply a branch of property law. Mineral law
has its own special problems and technical matters, but the funda-
mental concerns are the same as those permeating the rules and
doctrines of other areas of property law: long-term stability, predic-
tability, and uniformity that allow the careful practitioner and his
clients to conduct their transactions and plan their activities with
assurance that their intentions will be given effect and that their
reliance upon reasonable assumptions and inferences from prior
cases and statements of the law will not cause them to lose their in-
vestments.
Cases arise in oil and gas law and proceed to the appellate level
for two reasons only: poor planning by attorneys, or a failure of the
law to provide definite, certain and reasonable rules to guide those
dealing in mineral rights in ordering their transactions. The bar of
Louisiana is sufficiently experienced and sophisticated that the
former is seldom a cause of litigation. Rather, the cases reported in
recent years have tended to be in several areas where the law gives
little guidance for planning or for resolution of disputes without
resort to the courts. The Mineral Code has settled some
troublesome issues that previously prompted litigation, but cases in
several areas will recur until the courts give clearer standards for
predicting the treatment of particular controversies by the courts or
until legislation provides such standards. The two areas in which
litigation is most likely to continue-implied lease obligations and
conservation practice-will be discussed first. In such matters, the
author intends no criticism of the courts or the administrative agency,
for they have had to work with the case law and statutes as they
have received them.
IMPLIED LEASE OBLIGATIONS
A. Diligent Development
The law of implied lease covenants to drill additional wells in
other jurisdictions, according to the authors of the leading casebook
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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on oil and gas law, has deyeloped to the point that "regulatory com-
missions have adopted regulations requiring wider spacing than in
earlier years. It is not surprising, therefore, that current litigation
involving . . . the reasonable development covenant is greatly
reduced."1 Nevertheless, litigation regarding implied lease duties for
further drilling continues to arise with some frequency in Louisiana,
because the courts have generally been unwilling to distinguish be-
tween an implied duty of reasonable development and one of further
exploration. The failure to provide clear standards has been a virtual
invitation to litigation.
The duty of additional drilling on a lease tract is implied from
the lease itself and imposed by article 122 of the Mineral Code
which provides that the lessee will "develop and operate" the prop-
erty leased as a prudent operator.' That the lessee will, in the
appropriate circumstances, drill more wells than the lease expressly
requires to keep it alive beyond the primary term is said to be im-
plied in the lease. Other jurisdictions determine if the lessee has
acted as a prudent operator by requiring the lessor who claims a
breach of the implied duty to prove that a lessee could drill a well in
a known producing formation which would produce oil and gas in
paying quantities.' These jurisdictions do not require the lessee to
explore to depths that are not known to have formations capable of
producing in paying quantities." The Louisiana courts, on the other
hand, indicate, and sometimes hold, that a lessee must both
reasonably develop and explore further under what might be termed
the implied obligation or covenant of diligent development." Without
a requirement that the lessor prove the likelihood of production in
paying quantities from a known producing formation, the courts are
free to employ such a variety of factors to test what a prudent
operator would do in a given situation that it is difficult to advise a
client as to his development obligations and even more difficult to
predict the outcome of litigation.
A recent case on the diligent development obligation is Frazier
v. Justiss Meats Oil Company, Inc.' In this case, the lessor of oil and
gas rights on 160 acres of land brought suit for cancellation of the
1. H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, & C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS 501 (4th ed. 1979).
2. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:122 (1974).
3. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 801-878 (1980).
4. ld. §§ 841-843.
5. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:122, comments (1974); The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term -Mineral Rights, 39 LA. L. REV. 739,
750-52 (1979). But see Le Jeune v. Superior Oil Co., 315 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
6. 391 So. 2d at 485 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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100 acres outside a unit (consisting of 200 acres), the unit well for
which was on plaintiff's land. The lease contained no Pugh clause for
division of the lease upon unitization. The trial court held for the
plaintiff. The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that under the facts the lessee had fulfilled its obligation to
develop as a prudent operator. The lessee had drilled or participated
in drilling a number of wells in the area and had farmed out the hun-
dred acres in question for the purpose of development prior to suit
by the plaintiff. An unsuccessful well to the only known producing
formation-the Wilcox-was drilled on the farm-out prior to trial. In
most states, the court would have stopped at this point. But the
Louisiana court went on to indicate that the lessee had a duty to
develop the lease as to unproven formations of greater depth. The
duty had been satisfied by the lessee through his participation in
the area in a deeper play.'
B. Protection Against Drainage
Another facet of the implied obligation to act as a prudent
operator is the duty to prevent drainage from the lessor's property.
In this area, the matters likely to generate controversy are the manner
of fulfilling the duty and whether the lessee is held to a higher stan-
dard when it is he who is causing the drainage on an adjacent tract.
A recent case has spoken to these issues. In Pierce v. Goldking
Properties, Inc.,8 the plaintiff lessor brought suit against his lessee
for failure to protect his land from uncompensated drainage. The
lessee had completed a gas well on land adjacent to plaintiff's land
on August 21, 1974. The well was shut-in, and steps were under-
taken by the lessee to unitize the property a short time later. A pre-
application hearing was held on February 4, 1975. On February 7 a
public hearing on the proposed unit, which was to include portions
of plaintiff's land, was applied for, and the Commissioner of Conser-
vation then set the hearing for April 8, 1975. The well was put in
production on February 16, 1975. As of May 1, 1975, the effective
date of the unit established after the public hearing, the plaintiff
began to have royalty attributed to his property which was there-
after paid to him. Plaintiff's contention, expressed first in a letter of
July 2, 1975, was that he should have royalty paid to him from the
first date of production, not from the effective date of the unit.
Pertinent to the disposition of the case was Breaux v. Pan
American Petroleum Corporation,9 a case which indicated that the
7. Id. at 488.
8. 396 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
9. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481
(1964).
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obligation to protect against drainage can be fulfilled in two ways:
by drilling a well or by including the property in question in a unit
with the well causing the drainage. Implicit in Pierce v. Goldking is
recognition of a duty to undertake unitization. Until the unitization
takes effect, the rule of capture applies, said the third circuit in
Pierce, following the holding in Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co.10
Citing Breaux v. Pan American, the court said that "It]his result is
not changed merely because the mineral lessee is lessee of both the
tract on which the well is physically located and the tract or tracts
adjacent thereto."" The lessee had acted as a prudent operator and
thus was not liable.
By recognizing a duty to unitize or seek unitization the courts in
Louisiana are able to avoid a controversy that has posed problems
in other jurisdictions.'2 Where a lessor can show that drainage of his
property is taking place but cannot show that an offset well would
produce sufficient revenue to repay all of its investments and
operating costs, other jurisdictions have not required an offset well
to be drilled, 3 though some would require payment of damages if
the lessee was the party causing the drainage." In looking to a duty
to drill a well to offset drainage, one must focus on the profitability
of the well, which brings in its wake the necessity of further con-
sideration of whether the drainage is caused by the same lessee
since some courts might wish to ignore the profitability issue in the
common lessee situation. In looking to the duty to unitize or to seek
unitization, one need not be concerned with profitability of a well
nor whether the lessee is common to both tracts. Instead, the focus
is on the fact of drainage and the steps the lessee could take for
unitization. Of course, where the same lessee is common to both
tracts, unitization may be simpler. But even if the lessee is not common
to both tracts, the lessee is still able to seek unitization before the
Commissioner of Conservation.
Several further aspects of the case should be noted. The court
did rely in part on the lessor's delay in putting the lessee in default
until July of 1975, after the effective date of the unitization.
Damages can be calculated from a time prior to the putting in
default if the lessee is found to have had actual or constructive
knowledge of drainage.'6 However, the drainage in such a case would
be computed from the time a reasonably prudent operator would
10. 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ refused, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
11. 396 So. 2d at 534.
12. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, at § 824.
13. See Gerson v. Anderson-Pritchard'Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945).
14. Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1977); Millette v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 48 So. 2d 344 (Miss 1950).
15. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:136 (1974).
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have protected the leased premises, and, since the court found the
lessee had acted as a prudent operator, there could be no damages.
The remaining issues in the case concerning practice before the
Commissioner of Conservation are discussed in the next section.
CONSERVATION PRACTICE
The second significant area in which litigation tends to occur has
been with respect to matters related to the rules and orders of the
Commissioner of Conservation and practice before the Office of Con-
servation. In recent years a lessening of reluctance to bring suit
against the Commissioner has been observed. The reasons for this
are several. The money involved is far greater than a few years ago.
Second, there has been a revolution in due process in administrative
law in the past decade or so at the federal level,"6 accompanied by
enactment of a state administrative procedure act,'7 the full impact
of which has yet to be seen. Third, the Office of Conservation has
been given new duties in the areas of strip mine regulations, price
determinations for natural gas, and oil price and tax determinations,
all of which have increased the staff's work load and given new
areas in which controversy might arise.
A. Time in Which to Invoke Judicial Review
The importance of the Commissioner's orders and the necessity
of stability and finality of determinations by the Commissioner can-
not be overemphasized. Millions of dollars are spent on drilling and
production in reliance upon these orders, and many millions more in
property interests are maintained in existence by unitization orders.
Two competing interests in judicial review of action by the Commis-
sioner or in respect of practice before the Commissioner exist: all af-
fected persons should receive due process, and, on the other hand,
once entered the orders must have a high degree of finality so that
they may be relied upon.' s
A recent case in which the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit
wrestled with the problem of finality of a Commissioner's order and
the timing of judicial review is Jordan v. Sutton.'" At issue in the
16. E.g.0.Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For an illustration of the impact
on state law of the line of cases flowing from Goldberg, see Haughton Elevator Div. v.
State Div. of Administration, 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
17. LA. R.S. 49:951 et seq.
18. The author feels it necessary to bring out that he has been a consultant in
several cases involving challenges to Commissioner's orders, but these have not included
any cases discussed herein.
19. 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 42
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1980-1981
case was the validity of Order No. 78-F-4 dated April 20, 1979,
establishing the Bear Creek Pettit Limestone Gas Storage Area,
subject to the applicant, Southern Natural Gas, obtaining the con-
sent of 75 percent of the owners in interest in the area. The order
assumed that oil and gas wells in the area had been depleted. A sup-
plement to the order was issued July 3, 1979, with a finding that
more than 75 percent of the owners in interest had consented. The
plaintiff, an owner of an interest in the area, contended that the
Commissioner relied on false information in creating the storage
reservoir order. He filed suit against the Commissioner challenging
the order on July 21, 1980.
In response to the claim of the plaintiff, the Commissioner and
intervenor Southern Natural Gas filed exceptions of prescription
and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court sustained the exception of
prescription. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeal initially
reversed the trial court on the ground that the thirty day prescrip-
tive period of the Louisiana Administrative Procedures Act was not
an exclusive prescriptive period for judicial challenge of a Commis-
sioner's order. While Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:964(B) does re-
quire an action to set aside an order of an administrative agency to
be brought within thirty days of its becoming final, the court of ap-
peal felt that the provision of the Conservation Act for judicial
review of an order of the Commissioner, Louisiana Revised Statutes
30:12, is a "parallel and co-existing" form of review not superseded
by the Administrative Procedures Act, and it, said the court, does
not specify a time for review."' Thus the trial court erred 'in sustain-
ing an exception of prescription. Initially the court also declined to
apply the principle of laches.
On rehearing in Jordan v. Sutton on the laches issue, the court
remanded for further findings as to the unreasonableness of the
delay and the prejudice that may have resulted to the defendant or
third parties from the delay. The prior ruling on the prescription
issue was undisturbed.
If the first circuit is correct, then thousands of orders entered
over the years by the Commissioner of Conservation to unitize prop-
erty, upon which billions of dollars have been expended, are subject
to being overturned at any time, subject to the defense of laches based
on the individual facts of each case as to unreasonableness of delay
and the degree of prejudice to other parties. This result is most
troublesome, and the writer doubts seriously that the First Circuit's
reading of the Conservation Act is correct. The legislature did not
20. AL at 393.
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intend that the order of the Commissioner could be challenged in-
definitely any more than a court judgment could be appealed at any
time, even years later after the initial decision. Indeed, the orders of
the Commissioner are as serious as the judgment of a trial court and
seeking redress in court is an appeal, a seeking of judicial review,
not a trial de novo. Had the court recognized this, it perhaps would
have found a prescriptive period specified in the Conservation Act.
Section 15 of Title 30 provides the following:
In proceedings brought under authority of, or for the purpose
of contesting the validity of, a provision of this Chapter, or of an
oil or gas conservation law of this state, or of a rule, regulation,
or order issued thereunder, appeals may be taken in accordance
with the general laws relating to appeals. In appeals from judg-
ments or decrees in suits to contest the validity of a provision of
this Chapter, or a rule or regulation of the commissioner here-
under the appeals when docketed in the proper appellate court
shall be placed on the preference docket of the court and may be
advanced as the court directs."
To seek judicial review of an order of the Commisioner is to appeal
the order of the Commissioner. This usage of "appeal" and "review"
is common by the courts and legislatures and reflects the quasi-
judicial status of the administrative agency. The Texas legislature
was a bit more specific in this regard, for in the same situation
regarding judicial review of the Texas Railroad Commission, the
agency responsible for conservation regulation, it provides as
follows:
§102.111 Right to Appeal
A person affected by an order of the commission adopted
under the authority of this chapter is entitled to judicial
review of that order in a manner other than by trial de novo.
§102.112 Venue
Appeal shall be to the district court of the county in which
the land . . . is located ....
The author believes that this was also the intent of the Louisiana
legislature; for although the language was borrowed almost ver-
batim from the Arkansas conservation statute,23 the legislature
made a clear distinction in section 15 between "proceedings" (which
would include actions by the Commissioner) and "judgments or
decrees in suits." Only the latter is specified to be placed on the
21. LA. R.S. 30:15 (1950).
22. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. f§ 102.111 to .112 (Vernon) (emphasis added). See
Superior Oil Co. v. Texas R.R. Comm'n, 519 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-120.
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preference docket of the proper appellate court, but the "appeals"
language of the first sentence of section 15 relates to all "pro-
ceedings"; thus "proceedings" obviously contemplates something
more than "judgments and decrees in suits" that go to an appellate
court. Likewise, if "proceedings" contemplated only judgments from
a trial court, the legislature would have no reason to state specifically
in a statute that appeals would be taken in accordance with the
general laws relating to appeals; for that result would be effected
even without such language.
Pertinent also to this discussion is the final sentence of section
12, the section providing for judicial review. It states that "[t]he
right of review accorded by this Section shall be inclusive of all
other remedies, but the right of appeal shall lie as hereinafter set
forth in this Chapter." Section 12 creates the right of review and
section 15 specifies the timing and further manner of an appeal to a
court. Thus under section 15, the general laws relating to appeals
would govern the time within which suit may be brought to
challenge an order of the Commissioner, namely, thirty days for a
suspensive appeal and sixty days for a devolutive appeal."
B. Collateral Attack
A well-recognized principle of conservation practice was
reiterated in the Pierce v. Goldking case discussed above." The rule
provides that no collateral attack may be made upon an order of the
Commissioner of Conservation. In addition to the claims already
mentioned, the plaintiff alleged that the lessee had breached its
obligations to the plaintiff by failing to request that the effective
date of the unit be the date of the hearing, April 8, 1975, rather
than May 1, 1975, the date selected by the Commissioner. This
claim, said the court, was a collateral attack on the Commissioner's
order." Such orders can be challenged only in East Baton Rouge
Parish under the conservation statute.
24. LA. CODE CiV. P. arts. 2123 & 2087. For further comparison one should
perhaps note that that the New Mexico statute for judicial review provides for appeal
of an order of the oil conservation commission to the court of appeals and specifies a
time limit of thirty days for such appeal. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-25. Similarly, judicial
review of orders regarding oil and gas of the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma is
treated by appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 113, 277,
2876 (West 1971). The time for filing is thirty days from the date on which the order
appealed from shall have been made, as governed by the Oklahoma Civil Appeals Rule
1.76(c) Part III. Transok Pipe Line Co. v. Darks, 515 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1973).
25. See note 8, supra, and accompanying text.
26. 396 So. 2d at 534.
27. LA. R.S. 30:12 (1950).
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CONVEYANCING AND PRESCRIPTION
A. Prescription of Lignite Rights
The Louisiana Supreme Court has rendered a significant deci-
sion regarding the right to develop lignite in Continental Group v.
Allison." In its initial opinion, the court affirmed the holding of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal that a reservation of "all minerals"
in a 1956 conveyance, under the facts of that case, included lignite
rights even though strip mining of the land would prevent the use
of the land for the purpose for which it was purchased. On rehearing
the court reversed the second circuit and its earlier opinion on
another ground. It held that even with the reservation of "all
minerals," the right to develop the lignite had prescribed even
though prescription as to oil and gas may have been interrupted by
operations. In its first opinion, the court had followed the approach
of the second circuit in applying article 40 of the Mineral Code to
the issue of prescription of rights in the period since 1956." Article
40 provides basically that an interruption of prescription as to one
mineral effects an interruption as to all minerals." The opinion on
rehearing held that this article should not be applied to rights
vested prior to the effective date of the Mineral Code, January 1,
1975. In the words of Justice Blanche, "prior jurisprudence concern-
ing the preservation of servitudes by use provides us with the sim-
ple proposition that if you don't use it, you lose it, and if you don't
use it well enough you lose it.""1
Concern has been expressed by some members of the bar as to
the full impact of the opinion of the court on rehearing. After the
decision can it be claimed that a servitude for oil and gas as to
which prescription was interrupted by production or operations at a
shallow depth has terminated as to oil and gas at deeper depths
when ten years of nonuse accrued as to the deeper depths before
January 1, 1975? Can it be said that production of gas did not inter-
rupt prescription as to oil in the pre-Mineral Code period? This
writer does not believe that the opinion can be read so expansively.
The court looked to the great difference in the type of operations
for lignite and oil and gas and the extent of use of the land surface
in strip-mining. A servitude for oil and gas is used when one pro-
duces or seeks to produce oil or gas. The techniques are the same or
similar for oil and gas regardless of the depth. Drilling in good faith
28. 404 So. 2d 428 (1981).
29. See Continental Group v. Allison, 379 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
30. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:40 (1974).
31. 404 So. 2d at 437.
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to produce, or production of, oil or gas, at any depth would evidence
an intent to continue those rights.
B. Prescription of Servitude on Partitioned Tract
Prescription of a mineral servitude was at issue in Wall v.
Leger.2 The case brings out an important principle that has been in-
corporated in the Mineral Code but is sometimes misunderstood
regarding confusion. The case involved a tract of land (hereinafter
called the Leger tract) that had resulted from partition of the parent
tract in 1941. The parent tract was under lease when the 1941 parti-
tion took place, and when the partition was effected the owners
created a single servitude in favor of them all on the whole of the
parent tract. Thus, owners of the smaller individual tracts of land
were also owners of an undivided interest in the servitude burden-
ing all of the tracts established by the partition. One of these
smaller tracts was the Leger tract. Production on land of the parent
tract continued to December 14, 1964. On July 19, 1968, the owners
of the Leger tract conveyed the land to Leger with a reservation of
mineral rights. In a concursus proceeding provoked by a lessee pro-
ducing from a voluntary unit which included a portion of the Leger
tract, the foregoing facts gave rise to several issues.
First, the existence of the 1939 leases on the parent tract did
not prevent the creation of a servitude on the tract. This was clearly
correct. Second, the parties to the partition could partition the
parent tract while establishing a single servitude covering the
whole. Under the jurisprudence" and the Mineral Code,3' the parties
could clearly accomplish this through the appropriate steps. The
conceptual problem is that recognition of this latter point prevents
confusion from occuring; ie., it is possible to own both the land and
an interest in a servitude burdening the land. For example, if A and
B own Blackacre, a 100 acre tract, in indivision, and they partition it
in 1970 with the west 50 acres to A and the east 50 acres to B with
a reservation of a single servitude in favor of both covering all of
Blackacre, A will own his own tract subject to a servitude in himself
and B. To speak of A as owning the land and minerals on his tract
subject to a servitude for one-half the minerals in B would be incor-
rect. Thus if A were to convey his tract in 1978 to C subject to a
reservation of all minerals, and by 1980 there had been no drilling
or production on or attributable to Blackacre, the servitude would
32. 402 So. 2d at 704 (La. App. lst Cir. 1981).
33. Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
34, LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:67 (1974).
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expire on Blackacre and the mineral rights would belong to C, the
current owner. Since A's tract was subject to a servitude in 1978,
even though A was one of the owners of that servitude, A could not
create a new servitude and could not deal in the expectancy of the
termination of the outstanding servitude (or the reversionary right).
This last point was the holding of Wall v. Leger. Since a servitude
existed already on the Leger tract when Leger's vendor attempted
to reserve the mineral rights in 1968, the 1968 reservation was of no
effect. Prescription was measured from the last production on the
servitude on the parent tract, December 14, 1964, to December 14, 1974.
C. Executive Right: Bonus and Delay Rental
In Andrus v. Kahoa,5 plaintiffs were sellers of land who reserv-
ed one-half the minerals in the sale, giving, however, the purchasers
the exclusive right to lease all of the rights to the land. When the
purchasers' assignee leased the property to an oil company, the
assignee gave none of the bonus or delay rental to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs brought suit for their claimed share of bonus and delay
rental. The trial court dismissed the claim and the First Circuit
Court of Appeal affirmed.
Because the conveyance creating plaintiffs' rights was made
prior to the effective date of the Mineral Code, the first circuit had
to look to the pre-Code jurisprudence for its determination. It was
the opinion of the court that the pre-Code jurisprudence" and article
105"7 of the Mineral Code were to the same effect: Unless restricted
by contract, the executive right includes the right to retain bonuses
and rentals.
D. Partition
The effect of a partition by licitation upon a fractional mineral
servitude owned by a person not made a party to the partition sale
was an issue in Harmon v. Whitten.38 The facts of the case are
somewhat complicated and will be simplified by the use of letters
rather than the names of the parties. In the case, A acquired an un-
divided 1/6 interest in land including minerals. One month later he
filed suit for partition. Three months later, while his partition suit
was pending, A conveyed a 1/6 mineral interest in the land to B, his
father. Five months after this, judgment was rendered in the parti-
35. 400 So. 2d 1194 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
36. Ledoux v. Voorhies, 222 La. 200, 62 So. 2d 273 (1952): Mt. Forest Fur Farms of
America v. Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228 (1934).
37. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:105 (1974).
38. 390 So. 2d 962 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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tion suit, and a few months later the land was sold to X. The day
following, X conveyed 1/3 of the lana and minerals to A. One week
later B conveyed 1/8 royalty to C out of the 1/6 mineral interest he
thought he had. Five weeks after this, on September 16, 1976, A
again executed a deed to B for a 1/6 interest in the minerals, specify-
ing that the earlier conveyance had been extinguished by the parti-
tion sale. Subsequently X conveyed 1/2 of his rights to Y and three
weeks later A conveyed to X and Y his 1/3 interest in the land but
reserving all mineral rights he owned. Nine months later A again
conveyed a 1/6 mineral interest to B. Based on the foregoing trans-
actions, the unit operator paid a portion of the proceeds to A (1/6). X
and Y filed suit contending they owned 2/3 of the mineral interest
and B owned 1/3. Defendants contended that X and Y had 1/2, that B
was conveyed 1/3 and A owned 1/6. The trial court held for plain-
tiffs.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in a 2 to 1 opinion affirmed
the trial court, holding that the September 16, 1976, instrument be-
tween A and B showed agreement by them that B's servitude was
extinguished in fact by the partition sale. This instrument was to
convey the same 1/6 mineral interest. Whether or not article 179 of
the Mineral Code making the mineral owner a necessary party to a
partition suit is applicable to a mineral right created during the
pendency of the partition suit, the subsequent instrument executed
here would be a renunciation of the servitude and would extinguish
the right if it were not already extinguished in the partition sale.
Thus the renunciation and reconveyance of a 1/6 together with a
subsequent conveyance of 1/6 by A to B transferred all that A had a
right to convey, and A no longer had any interest.
E. Royalty Payment
The appellate courts have decided several significant cases in
the past year involving nonpayment or late payment of royalty owed
under oil and gas leases. Two of these were decided under pre-
Mineral Code standards because they arose prior to the effective
date of the Mineral Code. But they are of importance nonetheless
because a court may still need to inquire into the reasonableness of
a delay in payment despite the changes of the law brought about by
articles 137 and 138 of the Mineral Code. 9 That is, prior to the
Mineral Code lessors could seek lease cancellation for nonpayment
of royalty without first putting the lessee in default on the theory
that an unjustified delay in making payment was an active breach of
39. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137-138 (1974); see LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:135,
comment (1974).
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the lease. The Mineral Code changed this right by requiring notice
and demand by the lessor, with the lessee having thirty days in
which to respond. The lessee who fails to pay within the thirty days
may be liable for additional damages and attorney's fees, and the
lease possibly may be dissolved. Hence, a court will have to inquire
into the reasonableness of delay in giving its remedy when the
lessee has failed to pay the sums demanded withiq the thirty day
period.
In Bayou Bouillion Corporation v. Atlantic Richfield Company,"D
lessors filed suit against their lessee seeking cancellation of their
leases for improper payment of royalty. The lessee had promptly
paid the amount underpaid after demand by the lessors, stating that
mistakes in payment had not been discovered because of difficulties
in applying federal oil price controls. The lessors contended the
price controls did not apply to royalty owners and that the under-
payment was an active breach of the lease. The trial court held
against the lessors on all points and applied the Mineral Code with
respect to the necessity of putting the lessee in default. The Court
of Appeal for the First Circuit affirmed the decision but said it was
error to apply the Mineral Code to events prior to January 1, 1975.
Instead, the court said the Mineral Code was continuing the
jurisprudential trend of avoiding lease cancellation by finding the
nonpayment of royalties justifiable. Here, the court observed, under
the "massive changes occuring in the oil industry," the defendant
was justified in delaying a portion of its royalty payments, and thus
there was no active breach of the lease."
Likewise no active breach was found in Nunez v. Superior Oil
Company, 2 a case also arising prior to the adoption of the Mineral
Code. In this case the reason for the delay in payment was confusion
arising from the death of the royalty owner and substitution of his
son of the same name, first as executor then as heir. The son would
not execute a division order showing his interest ownership. After
several earlier stages of the litigation, not pertinent here, the trial
court gave a directed verdict in favor of the lessee. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that "a clerical error in the
context of otherwise reasonable conduct makes the delay not un-
justifiable." Nothing in the record showed that nonpayment was an
effort to coerce plaintiff into signing a division order, and the trial
judge was justified in directing a verdict for defendant.
Two other recent cases involving claims of underpayment of
40. 385 So. 2d 834 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1980).
41. Id at 840.
42. 644 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
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royalty required the courts to characterize the nature of the royalty
to determine the prescriptive period applicable to such claims. Plain-
tiffs in both cases sought payment for the ten years prior to bring-
ing suit.
In Hankamer v. Texaco, Inc., 3 the trial court sustained an Oxcep-
tion of prescription for claims accruing prior to three years before
filing, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit. This result followed from the court's finding that the royalty
was created in the sublease of a lease from the state. As a payment
by a sub-lessee to its sub-lessor, the royalty was rent" and thus the
three year prescriptive period of article 3538 of the Civil Code was
applicable."5
In contrast to Hankamer is the case of Augurs v. Amoco Produc-
tion Company," where the royalty in question was conveyed in a
compromise for avoiding cancellation of the lease, rather than being
created in granting the lease. This "overriding royalty" was not, in
the court's opinion, "rental royalty," so three years' prescription
was not applicable; rather, the proper prescriptive period was ten
years. The court expressed concern that the same result might not
be reached under the Mineral Code.'
Although this writer sees nothing incorrect in the conclusions of
the two courts involving the prescription issue, it is necessary to
ask whether treating the lessor's royalty claims less favorably than
the claims of owners of other royalty interests carved out of a lease
was actually justified. Consider for example the claim of A, the
grantor of a lease to X Company for a 1/8 royalty. The next day, X
conveys a 1/8 royalty on Blackacre out of its 7/8 working interest to
B, a geologist, in exchange for geological data held by B with
respect to Blackacre. Ten years later both A and B discover they
have been paid royalty improperly. A can only claim underpayment
for the preceding three years while B can claim it for up to ten
years. A sound reason for the distinction between the two may ex-
ist, but it escapes this writer.
43. 387 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
44. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:123 & comment thereto (1974).
45. LA. CiV. CODE 3538.
46. 465 F. Supp. 154 (W.D. La. 1979).
47. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:123 (1974) provides as follows:
Payments to the lessor for the maintenance of a mineral lease without drilling
or mining operations or production or for the maintenance of a lease during the
presence on the lease or any land unitized therewith of a well capable of produc-
tion in paying quantities, and royalities paid to the lessor on production are rent.
A mineral lessee is obligated to make timely payment of rent according to the
terms of the contract or the custom of the mining industry in question if the con-
tract is silent.
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